Exploiting the increase in personal tax rates due to the American Taxpayer Relief Act and Healthcare Act, we identify tax-minded executives who exhibit a preference for personal tax savings. We find that 2,281 top executives strategically realized their built-in capital gains prior to the tax hikes to save nearly $741 million in personal taxes in 2012. These executives also (1) make payout policy choices that save their shareholders taxes and (2) make tax strategy choices that save their firms cash taxes. Their firms altered payout policies in 2012, distributing $8 billion in special and accelerated dividends, to save shareholders nearly $700 million in taxes.
Introduction
We implement a unique identification strategy that allows us to provide novel insights on executives' tax-related corporate policies. We exploit the 2013 increase in personal income tax as established by The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) and the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Healthcare Act), to identify executives that revealed their tax preferences by actively implementing strategies to save personal taxes. We define these executives as "tax-minded." By identifying this tax preference we obtain an understanding of a characteristic that is imbedded in management's decision making and; therefore, can empirically examine firm dividend and tax outcomes as a function of executives and their tax-related policy choices.
Our identification strategy builds on the extensive literature that analyzes year-end security sales (e.g., Constantinides, 1984; Seyhun and Skinner, 1994; and Poterba and Weisbenner, 2001 ). In particular, Dyl (1977) , Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) , and Badrinath et al. (1991) find that tax loss selling occurs, a strategy to reduce one's tax liability at year-end whereby losers are sold to offset prior capital gains. The setting surrounding ATRA and the Healthcare Act is distinct from that of these papers, because the optimal tax strategy changes when there is an anticipated increase in the future tax rate. Built-in capital gains should be realized in the period before the increase, whereas losses should be held to offset higher taxes in the future period. We exploit this change to identify tax-minded executives who adopted a tax-efficient strategy by pre-emptively realizing their built-in capital gains prior to 2013.
We use the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required Form 4 filings to reconstruct each executive's insider holdings portfolio and, most importantly, compute the built-in capital gains of their holdings. We subsequently observe each executive's selling behavior in 2012 and identify executives who strategically lowered their future tax liability. We find that 2,281 tax-minded executives reduced their long term built-in gains to save nearly $741 million in capital gains tax in 2012, an average of $325 thousand per executive.
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In line with the corporate consistency literature (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2012; Davidson et al., 2013; and Hutton et al., 2013) , we expect that tax-minded executives exhibit their personal tax preference when making corporate decisions.
Thus, their dividend and tax policies should reflect an emphasis on shareholder and corporate tax savings, respectively. Specifically, our first conjecture is that these executives manage companies that are more considerate of the tax burden of their shareholders and, consequently, take actions consistent with this view. To test this prediction we first identify firms that altered their dividend policy to save their shareholders' taxes prior to the tax rate increases legislated by ATRA and the Healthcare Act. Firms that opted to award a special dividend in 2012 or accelerate a dividend from the first quarter of 2013 to the fourth quarter of 2012, allowed shareholders to lock-in the lower dividend tax rate before the tax hike. Similar to Hanlon and Hoopes (2014) we document that there is indeed a subset of firms who alter their dividend policy; however, our interest lies in examining the simultaneous actions of executives and firms surrounding the event. Specifically, we examine the link between taxminded executives and the firms that implement strategies to save their shareholders taxes.
Our empirical results support our conjecture. We find that firms managed by tax-minded executives were more likely to take actions in 2012 that reduced their shareholders' tax liabilities. The 1,010 companies managed by tax-minded executives awarded a total of $3.7 billion in special dividends and accelerated $4.3 billion in regular dividends. These dividend payouts collectively saved shareholders nearly $700 million in taxes.
Relatedly, both the media and prior research (e.g. Chetty and Saez, 2005 and Brown et al., 2007) point out that executives also substantially benefit from additional dividend awards when there is a change in personal tax rates. In particular, the media suggest that the distributions are mostly self-serving. For example, in November of 2012 The Wall Street Journal singled out the recently retired CEO of Costco, Jim Sinegal, because the company borrowed $3.5 billion to finance a special dividend whereby Sinegal would receive a payout of $14 million and consequently save over $4 million in taxes. While we do not dispute the benefits to executives, we maintain that the additional dividend payments in 2012 were largely due to executive tax preferences and are, therefore, an element within a series of actions aimed at reducing the tax burden of its shareholders. As such, we expect that the dividend payouts were in line with the executives' preexisting corporate tax policies which emphasized tax savings.
Formally stated, our second conjecture is that tax-minded executives manage companies that prioritize corporate tax savings and, therefore, employ effective tax planning strategies to lower firm tax liabilities. To test this conjecture, we conduct a panel analysis that tracks executives through time. We examine the link between tax-minded executives and each firm's cash tax payments over time, as measured by their cash effective tax rate (Cash ETR).
As predicted, we find that tax-minded executives manage firms that implement incremental cash tax savings strategies. On average, the presence of each tax-minded executive lowers a firm's Cash ETR by 0.28% per year, which is equivalent to cash tax savings of $2 million per year for the average firm in the sample. 3 The results in this paper contribute to the understanding of executives' corporate policies by academics and legislators. The first implication of our results is that an executive who places importance on personal tax savings is more likely to manage a company that undertakes actions that benefit their shareholders' tax outcomes. This finding provides evidence in support of the longstanding theory that managers internalize the effects of personal shareholder taxes when making corporate decisions (e.g., Miller, 1977; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Masulis and Trueman, 1988; Green and Hollifield, 2003) , as we identify a subset of executives who display this behavior in their decision-making.
Second, our findings with respect to firm Cash ETRs indicate that an executive that actively implements strategies to save on personal taxes will also implement strategies to lower firm taxes. Prior evidence shows that executives impact firm effective tax rates (Dyreng et al., 2010 ), but does not disentangle whether the effect is due to executives' tax policy or other correlated decisions that impact the outcome (Armstrong et al., 2010) . Our results more specifically demonstrate that executive tax preferences, which are imbedded in firms' policies, affect firms' tax outcomes. As such, we shed light on the open question of why some firms pay less in taxes than other firms. Moreover, our findings also provide evidence that the special and accelerated dividend payouts in 2012 were largely in line with the executives' pre-existing corporate tax policies that reduced firm cash taxes.
Third, shareholders are subject to double taxation, tax on corporate earnings and tax on dividend distributions. Thus, an executive can take two steps to save its shareholders taxes, the first step is to save corporate taxes and the second step is to make dividend distribution choices which reduce shareholders' tax burden. As such, corporate tax policy and dividend payout policy are related executive choices. Unlike prior papers that examine each of these policies independently, we show that an executive who is tax-minded is consistent in setting both policies. Therefore, we establish an important link between setting corporate tax policy and setting dividend payout policy.
In sum, the key innovation of this paper is that we implement a unique empirical strategy to identify tax-minded executives. Using this strategy we are able to analyze an executive's decision that is analogous in the personal and the corporate spaces: choosing to take legal tax strategies to lower the tax liability. This is starkly different from tax studies that focus on executives that misappropriate firm assets to evade taxes, such as Dhaliwal et al. (2009) and Chyz (2013) , because our identification is not dependent on the lack of corporate governance at the firm level. As a result, we are able to make broader inferences about executive tax preferences. We provide evidence to support that executives' personal tax preference is an important characteristic that directly maps into corporate tax and dividend policies.
Section 2 provides background on the 2013 tax rate changes. Section 3 describes sample formation and data. Section 4 discusses our identification strategy and develops our measures of tax-mindedness. Section 5 explores the impact that tax-minded executives have on shareholders' taxes, while Section 6 explores the impact on firm-level taxes. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Summary of 2013 tax rate changes
The 2013 tax year is marked by legislation that significantly increased tax rates for high-income taxpayers (Fig. 1) . First, set to commence in 2013, the revenue provision for the Healthcare Act established a 3.8% personal income tax on passive investment income for taxpayers with an adjusted gross income (AGI) of $250 thousand for married joint filers (MFJs) and $200 thousand for single filers. 4 Consequently, a surtax was imposed on income from capital gains and dividends.
Moreover, the tax provisions in the Economic Growth and Tax (JGTRRA) were set to expire on December 31, 2012. These expirations would eliminate the favorable ordinary income, qualified dividend, and long-term capital gain tax rates for individuals in the top income bracket. The highest ordinary income tax bracket was scheduled to increase by 4.6% to 39.6% and the highest capital gains rate was scheduled to increase by 5% to 20%. Qualified dividends were to lose their preferential tax treatment and increase to ordinary tax rates, rising from 15% to 39.6%.
On July 24, 2012 the ATRA bill was proposed to address the expiration of EGTRRA and JGTRRA. The bill called for a one-year temporary extension of both acts. The House passed the bill on August 1, 2012; however, the Senate put it on hold due to the impending presidential election and the dichotomous views of the candidates. A tight race existed between the current president, Barack Obama, who pushed for raising taxes on the wealthiest Americans and his opponent, Mitt Romney, who championed lower tax rates. On November 6 th , the uncertainty was resolved as the president was re-elected to office.
The bill was revisited and subsequently became a political bargaining chip in the negotiations aimed at avoiding the fiscal cliff. Numerous scenarios were discussed and considered over the last two months of 2012, but the federal tax policy remained unresolved through the end of the year. On January 1 st , 2013, the Senate passed the bill after incorporating changes that raised tax rates. The next day, the president signed ATRA into law. The final version of ATRA affected taxpayers with an AGI over $450 thousand for MFJs and $400 thousand for single filers by raising the ordinary income rate from 35% to 39.6%, the qualified dividend rate from 15% to 20%, and the capital gain rate from 15% to 20%. Thus, the Healthcare Act and ATRA jointly raised the maximum tax rate on capital gains and dividends to 23.8%, nearly a 60% increase in tax on these types of passive investment income.
Sample formation and data
We use several data sources in this study. 
Identifying tax-minded executives

Executive reactions to ATRA
The enactment of ATRA was a significant event for high-income taxpayers as it represented the end of favorable tax rates on ordinary income, capital gains, and qualified dividends. Prior studies by Bolster et al. (1989) and Seida and Wempe (2000) find that the unfavorable change in tax rates following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had a direct impact on trading behavior. We similarly expect that the 2013 tax hike affected trading behavior; however, our focus is on the change in behavior leading up to the event. We conjecture that executives, on average, pre-emptively reacted to the impending 2013 increase in capital gains tax rates by shifting stock sales to 2012. Due to the timing of the tax legislation, the effect is likely most prominent during December of 2012. Therefore, we analyze the historical difference in executive stock sales from December to January. Figure 2 shows these results.
Framework
Having established that the impending 2013 tax rate increases spurred executives to increasingly sell their shares, we direct our attention to identifying which individuals took action. To do so, we present a simple tax framework.
In a world where taxes are the only friction, the profits of selling a stock at time are
given by the built-in capital gains after tax:
where is the price at time , 0 is the price at the time of acquisition (i.e. tax basis), and is the tax rate at time .
If an investor has positive built-in gains, i.e. − 0 > 0, and the tax rate will change such that < +1 , there is a tax-saving strategy whereby he sells in and repurchases in + 1 if the following condition holds:
If the time interval between and + 1 is sufficiently small (e.g. December 31 at 11:59
and January 1 st at 12:00), the prices are likely to remain constant, and thus by construction there would be an opportunity for tax-savings: A second strategy exists whereby the investor permanently defers the realization of capital gains. However, this alternative is unlikely for at least two reasons. First, there are benefits to diversification that cannot be attained if an investor's portfolio is not rebalanced.
Second, an investor's investment horizon may be different from that of the firm.
Thus, in the absence of non-tax costs, individuals with built-in capital gains should realize their gains to save on taxes. However, empirically we observe that only 16% of executives realized more than 80% of their long term built-in capital gains in 2012. This indicates that there must be additional factors that affect each investor , such that their expected profits from exercising the strategy are better described by:
These additional factors can include a variety of unobservable costs such as the political or image costs of being perceived as a greedy or unpatriotic executive (Graham et al., 2013) , or market frictions such as transaction costs or the costs associated with hiring an expert to gather tax knowledge. These costs need not be the same for all executives, as they depend on each executive's tax preferences. For example, managers' political preferences affect corporate policies (Hutton et al., 2013) , family owners are more concerned with the reputation costs of being tax aggressive (Chen et al., 2010) , and CEOs with military experience tend to avoid less tax (Law and Mills, 2013) . Furthermore, executives are also subject to insider trading laws and other restrictions set by the Board of Directors that may prevent them from selling and immediately repurchasing shares. For example, executives are not allowed to trade in opposite directions within a six-month period. This constraint becomes more costly in cases where the executive has insider information that indicates a positive abnormal return in the next six months.
Therefore, analyzing the variation in executives' reactions to the 2013 tax hikes provides an insight into their personal cost and benefit functions related to tax strategy. We develop measures of tax-mindedness that are based on executives' revealed tax preferences and intend to capture the idiosyncratic costs they face. Note that we exclusively focus on executives with built-in capital gains. Executives with zero gains or built-in losses throughout 2012, which make up less than 5% of the sample, would not have the opportunity to lower their tax liability by selling prior to 2013. As such, their tax preferences are unobservable and these executives must be excluded from the analysis.
Personal Tax-Minded Measures
We define tax-mindedness as a preference for tax savings that is revealed through strategic actions to improve tax outcomes. In our setting, executive tax-mindedness can be observed via the reduction of built-in gains before the increase in personal tax rates in 2013.
This identification strategy requires that we quantify each executive's long-term built-in capital gains as of December 31, 2011 and throughout 2012. To do so, we reconstruct each executive's insider holdings portfolio starting with his first insider transaction.
Specifically, for every acquisition that an executive makes, we create a batch that records the number of shares and their corresponding purchase price. This is referred to as tax basis. Note that all 2012 acquisitions are excluded because a minimum holding period of one year must be met for gains on stock sales to qualify for long-term capital gains treatment. When an executive sells shares we adjust the number of shares in each batch using the First-In FirstOut (FIFO) method, in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
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At each period of interest we observe the number of shares that remain in the executive's portfolio and record the current price per share. We then subtract the tax basis from the current value of the shares to obtain the long-term built-in capital gains of each portfolio. Thus, at each point in time the built-in capital gains for a particular executive are
given by:
where is the price at time , is the price at which shares in batch were acquired, is the number of shares in batch at time , and is the total number of batches.
We then observe which executives decreased their built-in capital gains prior to the tax hike and create three tax-mindedness variables. Tax_Minded_2012 identifies executives who reduced their built-in capital gains throughout 2012. It is calculated as the difference between the initial built-in capital gain during 2012 and the built-in capital gain at January 1, 2013. 6 The following two variables capture executives who more aggressively reacted to the tax change.
Tax_Minded_Dec identifies executives whose built-in gains increased through December 1, 2012 and who subsequently realized their built-in gains during the month of December.
Tax_Minded_80 identifies executives who reduced more than 80% of their built-in gains by 5 For the purpose of calculating capital gains, the IRC calls for the FIFO method or exact identification of the shares to be sold. We use the FIFO method because we cannot observe whether exact shares were identified for every sale of stock. Nonetheless, we consider the FIFO method to be a reasonable assumption as it is the default method used at brokerage houses and, per the IRC, to change from FIFO the client is required to identify the exact shares at each moment they trade and no later. 6 Executives with positive built-in capital gains at the start of the year are assigned the capital-gain value at January 1, 2012. All other executives are assigned the value from their first positive month of capital gains.
the 2012 year-end. 7 The definitions of these variables are summarized as follows: 
Tax Variable Definition
Descriptive Statistics
Validation of the measures
The larger the executive's built-in gain during 2012, the greater the incentive to sell before January 1 st , 2013. In other words, as the incentives increase executives are more likely 7 80% is a natural breakpoint in the distribution of built-in capital gains changes. The main results are robust to changing that threshold in the 60% to 90% range.
to derive enough tax benefits to offset the potential costs associated with realizing their capital gains. Therefore, to validate our measures we test whether there is an increase in the likelihood that an executive is tax-minded as his built-in capital gains increase. We use a logistic regression model with the following specification:
The dependent variable, Tax_Minded informed. An older executive is also more likely to have a shorter investment horizon, which reduces the foregone investment returns associated with making an early tax payment on capital gains. We include firm controls for size and the firm's six-month post period return.
Firm size controls for potential costs associated with the visibility of the company. Lastly, the company's stock return during the first six months of 2013 controls for the cost of realizing capital gains when an executive has positive private information.
Note that Tax_Minded_80 is excluded from this analysis because by construction it captures two opposing effects, costs and benefits. The greater the built-in capital gains the greater the incentive to sell and the greater the cost of realizing 80% of those gains. Therefore, there would be no clear interpretation for the coefficients of our main explanatory variable when using Tax_Minded_80 as the dependent variable.
There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the tax-mindedness measures and the level of built-in capital gains (Table 3 ). These results validate that our measures of tax-mindedness capture the economic tradeoff that exists in our theoretical construct. Notably, the area under the curve (AUC) is relatively low across models, 56% to 62%, and the control variables do not provide large incremental explanatory power to the regressions. This indicates that our tax-mindedness measures capture a significant element of tax preferences that is not captured by readily observable characteristics of the executives and the firms.
Economic significance of executive tax savings
To assess the economic magnitude of the effect, we quantify the tax savings of the executives identified as Tax_Minded_2012. We find that these executives reduced their long-term built-in gains in excess of $8.4 billion or 47%. The reduction of these gains in 2012
effectively reduced their tax liability by nearly $741 million, which is equivalent to an average savings of $325 thousand per executive.
Tax-minded executives and shareholders' taxes
The main thesis of the paper is that tax-minded executives have a preference for tax savings which affects their corporate decisions. Specifically, our first conjecture is that these executives manage companies that are more considerate of the tax burden of their shareholders and, consequently, take actions consistent with this view. To test this hypothesis we examine firm dividend payout policy in 2012.
The period before the 2013 tax change is an optimal setting to test this hypothesis because the impending increase in dividend tax rates created an opportunity for companies to observed in 2010 when JGTRAA and EGTRRA were initially set to expire. We therefore examine whether tax-minded executives were more likely to manage the companies that distributed special dividends or accelerated the payment of their regular dividends in anticipation of their shareholders' tax increases.
Special Dividend Awards in 2012
We test whether there is an increase in the probability that company awards a special dividend when there are more tax-minded executives in the firm. We use the following logistic model:
The dependent variable takes the value of one for those firms that awarded a special dividend, and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable, Tax_Minded_Execs, is the number of tax-minded executives present in each company. We control for several firm characteristics such as firm size, market-to-book-ratio (MTB), cash on hand, financial leverage, return on assets, cash from operations, and institutional stock holdings. We also include industry fixed effects.
We expect that companies with more cash holdings (Jensen, 1986) and stronger past performance (Fama and Babiak, 1968) are more likely to make special payouts. Moreover, we predict that companies with low leverage will use dividends as a means to rebalance their capital structure. We include institutional investors as a control, because they have different tax implications than that of individual investors (Allen et al., 2000; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005) . MTB controls for growth opportunities. Lastly, industry fixed effects control for possible industry-wide shocks that could have triggered the distribution of special dividends in 2012.
We find strong evidence that the presence of each tax-minded executive significantly increases the likelihood of a company awarding a special dividend throughout 2012 (Table 4) .
The odds ratio is between 1.06 and 2.36 across the different models. The coefficients on the control variables are not always significant; however, we find that their signs are consistent with our economic predictions. For instance, the coefficient on the institutional holdings variable is negative, which is consistent with the dividend catering theory Wurgler, 2004a and 2004b) . In this setting institutional investors do not demand an increase in special dividends because they do not obtain a significant tax benefit. Lastly, the AUC is between 78%
and 82% for the models that include controls and industry fixed effects. This indicates that our models are useful to predict which companies are more likely to award a special dividend.
Acceleration of regular dividends to the fourth quarter of 2012
We use a logistic regression model to examine whether the probability of a company accelerating the payment of its regular dividends increases with the presence of tax-minded executives. To define a company as a dividend accelerator, all three of the following conditions must be met: (1) the company paid a dividend during the first quarter of 2011 and 2012, (2) the company decreased or did not pay a dividend in the first quarter of 2013, and (3) the company increased a payment in the last quarter of 2012. We include the same set of controls that appear in the special dividends regression; however, we do not expect that any of the nontax variables will play a critical role in the decision to accelerate a dividend by less than one quarter. Therefore, in contrast to the analysis of special dividends, we expect the coefficients of the control variables to be statistically insignificant across models. The general specification is as follows:
There is a positive and significant relation between the number of tax-minded executives in a firm and the likelihood that a company will accelerate dividends ( Table 5 ). The odds ratio that a regular dividend paying company will accelerate the payment of dividends increases by 1.2 to 1.5 with the presence of each tax-minded executive. As predicted, the coefficients associated with the control variables are insignificant. This is explained by the low cost of accelerating a dividend, which is equivalent to the cost of borrowing funds for a period shorter than 3 months.
Economic significance of tax savings from special dividends and dividend accelerations
The tax-minded executives in our sample manage 1,010 companies. These companies awarded a total of $3.7 billion in special dividends and accelerated $4.3 billion in regular dividends in 2012. Due to the lower dividend tax rate, the dividend payouts collectively saved shareholders nearly $700 million in taxes. 8 We perform additional analyses on the 194 Tax_Minded_Dec executives to quantify their impact. We find that these executives saved roughly $78 million in taxes by realizing capital gains during December 2012. They manage 144 companies. Of these companies, 100 award dividends regularly. Of the regular dividend issuers, 28 awarded special dividends or accelerated dividends in 2012. Of the 44 non-regular dividend issuers, five granted a special dividend.
Historical analysis of specials and accelerations
Finally, to verify that our results with respect to special and accelerated dividends are driven by a tax choice and not due to other unique characteristics of tax-minded executives,
we perform a falsification test. We examine whether the presence of tax-minded executives explains the distribution of special dividends or acceleration of regular dividends in prior years.
While we expect that our tax-mindedness variables are able to explain payouts in 2012 and potentially in 2010, we do not expect to find a relation between these variables in other years.
9 Table 6 reports the results of a logit regression where the dependent variable takes the value of one if the company paid a special or accelerated a dividend during the year. The choice of controls is the same as in Tables 4 and 5 . Evidence from Table 6 is consistent with our prediction. There is a positive and significant relation between the number of tax-minded executives and the likelihood of a company distributing a special dividend or accelerated dividend in 2012 and 2010, but not in other years.
Robustness checks
In this section we perform additional tests to analyze the robustness of our results.
Tax-mindedness or price decline?
A potential concern is that our identification strategy can possibly misidentify executives as tax-minded if the stock price of their company had a sharp decline during 2012, thus reducing their built-in capital gains. Even though this reduction in built-in capital gains is consistent with an optimal tax strategy, it can be argued that these executives need not take any action and therefore should not be categorized as tax-minded. To address this concern, we repeat the analyses from Sections 6.1. and 6.2., excluding all companies whose stock price decreased during 2012.
An issue with this type of test is that it reduces the sample size; however, only 28% of the firms in our sample are excluded since the S&P 500 rose over 11% in 2012. Models (1) and (3) in Table 8 show the results for specials and accelerations respectively. In both models the coefficient associated with the number of executives is positive, although it is only significant for accelerations.
Tax-mindedness or restricted stock holdings?
A second potential concern is that an executive's portfolio is likely to have restricted stock. This could impact our identification if the restricted stock holdings hinder some executives from strategically selling in 2012. To mitigate this concern, we conduct additional analyses that do not include the value of restricted stock in the calculation of built-in capital gains.
A couple of caveats are in order. First, Execucomp only shows the restricted stock holdings on an annual basis; therefore, only Tax_Minded_2012 and Tax_Minded_80 can be adjusted. Second, we assume that the tax basis of the restricted stock is equal to zero, as it is common that restricted stock is awarded at no cost or very little cost. Table 8 shows that our results are robust to the exclusion of restricted stock.
Tax-minded executives and corporate taxes
The While the magnitude of these tax benefits undeniably provides executives with incentives to act, it is important to note that the fundamental driver behind these decisions is the executives' preference for tax savings. It stands to reason that this preference is also present when making other managerial choices. Therefore, we maintain that the additional dividend payments in 2012 were not an opportunistic one-shot action, but rather an element within a series of actions aimed at reducing the tax burden of its shareholders. As such, we expect that the dividend payouts were in line with the executives' preexisting corporate tax policies which emphasize tax savings.
Formally stated, our second conjecture is that tax-minded executives manage companies that prioritize tax savings and, therefore, employ incremental tax planning strategies to lower firm tax liabilities. We test this prediction using a panel regression that tracks executives through time. The panel includes all firm years that have at least two executives whose tax preferences have been identified from their actions in 2012. This restriction mitigates the issue of attributing a tax outcome in a previous year to a single identified executive. 10 For the same reason we use a one-year measure of cash taxes paid, as opposed to a longer measure, as the outcome variable. 
Cash ETR measures the cash taxes paid by the firm. The main explanatory variable is the number of tax-minded executives who are present at each company. We control for firm characteristics that are associated with tax avoidance (e.g., Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Mills et al., 1998) . These controls include firm size, leverage, multinational operations, R&D intensity, intangibles, and advertising expense. We also include industry and year fixed effects.
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that there is a negative and statistically significant relation between Cash ETR and Tax_Minded_2012 and Tax_Minded_80. The presence of each tax-minded executive reduces the cash effective tax rate by 0.28% to 0.65% per year, which is equivalent to cash tax savings of $2 million to $4.5 million for the average firm in the sample. This result suggests that executives' tax preferences are stable over time and is consistent with tax-minded executives implementing long-term corporate tax policies that are aimed at reducing cash taxes for the firm. This finding also demonstrates that executives were not simply acting in self-interest by awarding additional dividends in 2012. On the contrary, these tax-minded executives maintain an overall corporate policy of tax minimization, saving taxes for both their firms and its shareholders.
Conclusion
This paper examines executive tax preferences, a previously unexplored characteristic of executives that maps into firm dividend and tax policies. We implement a unique empirical approach to identify tax-minded executives who demonstrate a preference for tax savings.
Specifically, we exploit the setting in 2012, the year prior to large tax rate increases legislated by ATRA and the Healthcare Act, to identify executives who lowered their tax liability by realizing their built-in capital gains prior to year-end. We then examine the link between taxminded executives and the firms who awarded additional dividends in 2012 with the intention of reducing the tax burden of their shareholders. Lastly, we analyze the link between taxminded executives and the firms who pay less cash taxes than their industry peers.
We find that tax-minded executives saved nearly $741 million in personal taxes by reducing their built-in capital gains prior to 2013. They are also between 1.19 and 1.34 times more likely to manage firms that take incremental steps to lessen shareholder taxes. This is evidenced by their firms awarding two types of dividend payouts, $3.7 billion in special dividends and $4.3 billion in accelerated dividends, prior to the 2013 tax hikes. These payouts collectively saved shareholders nearly $700 million in taxes. Additionally, tax-minded executives manage firms that actively strategize to reduce their tax liability. The presence of each tax-minded executive reduces a firm's Cash ETR by 0.28% to 0.65%. This is equivalent to a $2 million to $4.5 million cash tax savings per tax-minded executive per year.
In sum, we present evidence that tax-minded executives save on personal taxes and make strategic decisions at the firm level that save their shareholders taxes and firm cash taxes.
As such, we identify a contributing factor that sheds light on the open question of why some firms pay less in taxes than other firms. Our findings also support the longstanding assumption that managers internalize the effects of personal shareholder taxes when making corporate decisions. In future work, it would be useful to examine other aspects of firms managed by tax-minded executives, such as capital structure and performance. We leave these subjects for future research. Table A. 1. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The Odds-Ratio factor for an increase of 1% in the initial built-in capital gains is presented. It is calculated as the exponential of the coefficient and is provided for interpretation purposes.
Dependent Variable:
Model:
(1) Tax_Aware_Dec Table 4 . Likelihood of a company awarding special dividends, logistic regression 2012.
This table reports the estimation results from logit regressions of the following form: ( ) = + ( . ) + + . In this model the dependent variable is an indicator for special dividends paid during 2012. The independent variable is the number of tax-minded executives present at each firm. The independent variable in columns 1 and 2 is TM_2012, in columns 3 and 4 is TM_Dec, while in columns 5 and 6 is TM_80. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table A.1. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. P-values are reported below the coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The Odds-Ratio factor for an increase of 1 tax-minded executive is presented. It is calculated as the exponential of the coefficient and is provided for interpretation purposes. This table reports the estimation results from logit regressions of the following form: ( ) = + ( . ) + + . In this model the dependent variable is an indicator for accelerated dividend payment from the first quarter of 2013 to the last quarter of 2012. The independent variable is the number of tax-minded executives present at each firm. The independent variable in columns 1 and 2 is TM_2012, in columns 3 and 4 is TM_Dec, while in columns 5 and 6 is TM_80. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table A.1. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. P-values are reported below the coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The Odds-Ratio factor for an increase of 1 tax-minded executive is presented. It is calculated as the exponential of the coefficient and is provided for interpretation purposes. In this model the dependent variable is an indicator for special dividend paid in 2012 or accelerated dividend payment from the first quarter of 2013 to the last quarter of 2012. The independent variable is the number of tax-minded executives present at each firm. The independent variable in columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 is TM_2012, while in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 is TM_80. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Tax-mindedness variable:  TM_2012  TM_80  TM_2012  TM_80  TM_2012  TM_80  TM_2012  TM_80  TM_2012  TM_80 Model: 
